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IF AN ONTOLOGIST COULD SPEAK WE COULDN’T UNDERSTAND HIM
SIMON HEWITT
1
In On What There Is, Quine introduced us to McX and Wyman, metaphysicians of the
old school whose bloated ontologies offended those with a taste for desert landscapes [15].
These philosophers have long since retired; meanwhile a younger ontologist has taken up
the debates with which they engaged. Dr Zedson is a very different character. He1 shares
Quine’s taste for austerity. With Quine, he is wary of reading off ontological commitments
from surface features of workaday true assertions in natural language.2
The purpose of the present paper is to take on Zedson, and the movement within con-
temporary analytic philosophy that he represents, sometimes called the ontological turn.
My reasons for objection are rooted in the theory of meaning and focus on an area about
which Zedson differs from Quine. In order to prepare the ground for what follows this dif-
ference needs to be laid out. I will do this before proceeding to the substantial arguments.
Zedson’s fundamental distinctive thought is methodological. He is not concerned with
what exists in the ordinary sense of the word ‘exist’3. Such matters are trivial, and to be re-
solved by attention to our ordinary linguistic practices. But this is not serious philosophy:
that discipline, in its metaphysical mode, concerns itself with the ‘deep’, ‘fundamental’
question of what ‘really exists’.4 This is not a question whose investigation will be helped
Key words and phrases. ontology, meta-ontology, quine, fundamentality, existence, quantifiers.
1He is most definitely a he, not only because of the poor gender balance in theoretical philosophy, but also because
some of his most prominent female peers pursue significantly different approaches [20] [21].
2Here, of course, he stands in wider analytic tradition going back to Russell’s On Denoting.
3Or any of its ordinary senses if it possesses more than one.
4Here Zedson agrees with various of his peers [22] [4].
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much, if at all, by attention to natural language, any more than the semantics of predica-
tion provide the Armstrongian realist with a route to the affirmation of universals [2]. The
proper methodology for metaphysics, insists Zedson, applies standard scientific criteria of
theory choice to distinctively ontological questions. Metaphysics postulates real existents
(the ‘real’ is dropped once we get the point), those that carve the beast of reality at the
joints, and it does so to the extent that they do explanatory work, in an elegant, economi-
cal, and consistent fashion.
Or at least metaphysics would postulate real existents, were it in a position to postulate
anything. In his more angst ridden moments, Zedson denies his discipline even this priv-
ilege. Disregarding English ‘exists’ entirely, he focuses on defending the view that there
could be a fundamental language, or perhaps there is such a language (where languages are
abstract objects), in terms of which the ontic make-up of reality could be limned. Its quan-
tifiers would carve reality at the joints and its singular terms would refer to genuine entities.
This language Zedson calls Ontologese. Since I do not understand Ontologese, I am not
in a position to adjudicate its merits as a vehicle for metaphysical disputes. However as a
speaker of English I take it that if the claim is that ‘exists’ in Ontologese tracks reality in a
way that ‘exists’ in English fails to do,5 there must be some (non-magical) process in which
I can be brought to understand the Ontologese word. This might be piecemeal, involving
me in a chain of more joint-carving revisions of English ‘exists’,6 at the end of which I
have an expression with the same meaning as the Ontologese quantifier, but there must be
some such process or else Zedson is not investigating any question I can understand.
At other times, Zedson is more concessive than in his Ontologese-advocating moments.
English ‘exists’ is fine as it stands, so far as it goes. Indeed sentences made using it are
5And questions framed in terms of English ‘exists’ are the ontological questions I am interested in, at least ini-
tially. If Zedson wants me to believe that there are other questions, properly called ontological, yet not expressible
in natural languages of the sort we speak, he needs to provide me with a reason to believe that. He has further
work to do subsequently to convince me that these questions are interesting.
6Here and throughout I’m assuming that ‘exists’ is synonymous with a particular quantifier for English. There
are philosophers who deny this, distinguishing between the quantifier and existence concepts. See [5] and [1], as
well as p. vi below. Nothing of importance here turns on this, and readers should feel free to alter my usage to
aid agreement.
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frequently true. Tables exist, for Zedson in this mood, as happily do you and I.7 The prob-
lem is, according to Zedson, that cataloguing the existents using the customary sense of
‘exists’ is not philosophically deep or interesting. I learn nothing of value about the nature
of reality in observing that it contains tables. What we need is an account of what exists
really, deeply, fundamentally, or ontologically, that is what exists according to some re-
stricted sense of ‘exists’ which carves reality at the joints. Let us call this real existence;8
the ontologist is interested in what really exists. Given that, as we have seen, Zedson at
his most extreme ought still to be required to introduce us to the Ontologese quantifier by
means of restrictions of English ‘exists’, his apparently more ambitious project collapses
into the moderate one. Zedson, in either manifestation, asks what really exists.
Zedson will sometimes claim the mantle of Quine. It is certainly true that he may give
the impression of sharing with that philosopher a view of metaphysics as primarily con-
cerned with ontology. It is doubtful, however, that Quine himself would have absolved
Zedson of the charge he lays at the feet of Wyman, being ‘one of those philosophers who
have united in ruining the good old word “exist”’[15, 23]. Nor does the author ofWord and
Object sit as lightly to linguistic considerations as does Zedson. Similarly, the philosopher
behind Two Dogmas of Empiricism is hardly an ally of the view that there are distinctively
metaphysical explanations. However, failure of Quinean piety is the least of Zedson’s prob-
lems. My worry is that he is trying to use the word ‘exist’, as deployed prefaced with the
adverb ‘really’, in a way that makes it mysterious how any word with such a usage could
both be meaningful and have been acquired by language users such as ourselves. Serious
Ontology, as I shall term Zedson’s project, therefore violates a compulsory constraint on
an acceptable metaphysics, that it doesn’t generate mysteries about language of this sort.9
7Note, for example, that van Inwagen is happy to allow that ‘Tables exist’ as uttered in ordinary conversation
expresses a truth. When said in the ontology room, however, it is false [23, 2].
8The expression is Ross Cameron’s [4, 8]. A good sense of the register in which this form of ontological enquiry
is conducted is supplied from an external perspective by Tim Button, ‘[The ontologist] points out that this is the
ontology classroom, and not the Clapham omnibus. She says that ‘really’ should be read as italicized, or with a
capital-R, or in SHOUTING-CAPSLOCK. She thumps the desk’ [3, 215].
9In this I follow Dummett in [7] and [6].
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The complaint here is not that the Serious Ontologist uses the word ‘exists’ in a manner
that varies from common usage.10 Adapting or precisifying word meanings for technical
philosophical purposes is often both useful and acceptable.11 In cases where this is the
case we have reason to believe, however, that genuine thoughts can be expressed using the
adapted expression. To see where Serious Ontology goes wrong in this respect, let us con-
sider a case of acceptable meaning adaptation and contrast it with the Serious Ontologist’s
attitude towards ‘exists’. 12
2
The word ‘property’ is part of ordinary, everyday, English. We admire artworks for
their properties, doubt that the properties of gold make it a good material out of which to
construct car engines, and so on. We can discourse intelligibly and usefully about these
matters. Philosophers do, furthermore, interest themselves in properties in just this ev-
eryday sense: these are abundant properties, in Lewis’ terminology, where there is an
abundant property for every predicate in the language[11]. However, there might be good
reasons for taking a philosophical interest in a privileged subclass of the abundant proper-
ties. Perhaps, for example, I am interested only in those properties of which indispensable
mention is made in the laws of nature (in the sense that it would not be possible to truly
state all and only the laws of nature without mentioning those properties13), or which lend
causal efficacy to concrete particulars. Alternatively, I might be concerned to assay all and
only those properties that form a minimal supervenience base for the abundant properties.
10A Serious Ontologist might choose to frame the matter not in terms of the meaning of ‘exists’ but, for instance,
in terms of the contribution of the modifier ‘really’. In effect this gives us a version of the restriction strategy. The
criticism below still has purchase here, so I ignore the distinction in what follows. Thanks to Naomi Thompson
for discussion here.
11I bracket from consideration here the question of word individuation: is the Serious Ontologist’s ‘exists’ a token
of the same word-type as orindary English ‘exists’, or is it a distinct word with a related, perhaps analogously,
meaning? The present discussion doesn’t require us to decide this question.
12‘The symbol ‘∃’ is after all, essentially an abbreviation for the English ‘there are” [24, 29]. Ignoring the elision
of singular and plural quantification, given van Inwagen’s commitment earlier in the cited article to the position
that being is the same as existence, this gives us that the quantifier in the language of regimentation ‘essentially’
captures existence. But this looks incompatible with what van Inwagen has the ontologist say ’in the Ontology
Room’. Tables, after all, exist. There has to be a suspicion that a game of bait and switch is being played here.
We are introduced to ‘∃’ by means of our familiar friend ‘exists’ before being tempted into an unfamiliar desert
landscape that frustrates our actual linguistic resources.
13This qualification is needed in acknowledgement of the possibilities of error and ignorance with respect to the
laws of nature.
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Each of these criteria (and there are no doubt others) yields a sparse concept of property,
a proper restriction of the abundant concept of property, the investigation of the extension
of which promises to be illuminating.
When contemporary metaphysicians talk about properties, they often have in mind an
adapted meaning of the ordinary English ‘property’ corresponding to one of these sparse
concepts. Consider, for example, the kind of trope theorist who views property instances
as the atomic constituents of all entities. She will routinely write, as I just did, of tropes
as properties (‘particular properties’, ‘property instances’. . .). Whatever problems there
might be with trope-theoretic metaphysics, that the word ‘property’ lacks a meaning when
used in this manner is not one of them.14 Moreover, it is not in the least mysterious how
our ontologist could come to acquire the usage of the word ‘property’ such that it has this
adapted meaning. Call ‘property’ in this adapted sense property2. The introducer of prop-
erty2 to the language undertakes a process of semantic refinement of the sort sketched in
the previous paragraph: say, ‘for present purposes, I’m going to use “property” to pick
out only those properties of which indispensable mention is made in statements of laws
of nature’. The use of property2 is then passed on to other language users. In the normal
course of things, a technical usage of this sort will be transmitted explicitly – the lecturer
tells her undergraudate metaphysics class that she will use ‘property’ as property2. On
other occasions, however, a language user might acquire the usage without explicit initia-
tion into the linguistic practice of its use – the graduate student going along to a seminar
on the problem of universals gets a sense of how the word ‘property’ is being used, notices
the kind of situations in which it is appropriate to make assertions of the form pThere is
a property, F -nessq, and to refrain from making them, and so learns how to use the word
with the restricted sense.15 Either way, there is nothing mysterious about the manner in
14I note, without adjudicating, the question whether a string which uniformly lacks meaning in grammatically
appropriate contexts is properly described as a word at all.
15I take it that the end result of linguistic acquistion is knowledge how to use a word in sentential context, and do
not assume – contra [19] – that this reduces to propositional knowlege. Indeed in the case where the undergaduate
is explicity introduced to the usage, it looks as though she comes to know how to use the word (that is comes to
possess the same ability as her graduate colleague) through knowing that the word means such-and-such. Nothing
of present importance turns on this, however.
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which the usage is acquired.
Can we imagine a similar process by which an adapted sense of ‘exists’ might be devel-
oped and transmitted? One immediate worry is that ‘exists’, unlike (syntactic) quantifiers
does not seem to admit restrictions. We are familiar with cases like ‘All of the beers are in
the fridge’, but in the unhappy situation where an utterance of this sentence was rendered
inappropriate by my not having bought any beer, I would not say ‘No beers exist’. English
‘exists’ is a grammatical predicate, and whilst predicates sometimes admit restricted us-
ages – consider ‘is a property’ used by a metaphysician concerned to investigate the sparse
properties – there are no obvious acceptable uses of ‘exists’ with a restricted sense in or-
dinary life. This might be thought of little importance, since we can restrict quantifiers,
and it could be argued that, since ‘exists’ is satisfied by all and only the entities within the
range of the particular quantifier formalised as ‘∃’, the non-restrictability of the existence
predicate is a superficial feature of natural language of no metaphysical importance. In-
deed, it could be further insisted, it is precisely because we have quantificational devices
available that the existence predicate does not need to admit restriction.
This is too quick on at least two counts. First, it is not obvious that the quantifier is
co-extensive with the existence predicate. Whilst this is certainly something approaching
meta-ontological orthodoxy, and is explicitly defended by van Inwagen in [25], there are
clear problems with the claim. There are, are there not, some things that don’t exist, like
Pegasus? Less controversially, there are some things that no longer exist, like the USSR
and Henry VIII. For this reason a number of philosophers maintain that whilst existence
and the range of the quantifier overlap they do not do so with no remainder [5, Ch. 2] [12].
Second, even if it were the case that ‘exists’ – or something doing the same semantic work
as it – admitted restriction, that is far from enough for the Serious Ontologist’s purposes.
Not just any old restriction will do. Suppose that we are content with restricting the quan-
tifier, taking this to represent existence. Then in order to pursue Serious Ontology we need
there to be a restriction of it, which we can be brought to understand, such that it carves
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reality at the joints, ranging over all and only the privileged entities that are of particular
interest to ontologists (the ‘fundamental’, ‘basic’ or ‘real’ entities). The mere fact that are
some restrictions of the quantifier available does not establish this. And in the absence of
reassurance that we could acquire an understanding at least of what it would be to restrict
the quantifier in the Serious Ontologist’s favoured fashion, we have no reason to believe
that the claims she makes about the subject matter of Serious Ontology are meaningful, let
alone of philosophical interest.
But perhaps there is a suitable restriction at hand. When we looked at the metaphysician
of properties restricting property-talk to property2, we noted that the properties2 are those
properties of which indispensable mention is made in the statement of laws of nature.
Could a similar restricted use of ‘exists’ be introduced? Seemingly:
E Some entity x exists2 iff x exists and indispensable mention is made of
x in the laws of nature.
Assuming a satisfactory account can be given of what it is for indispensable mention to
be made of x in the laws of nature, which we allowed the property theorist, then E picks
out a (presumably proper) subplurality of the existents. Can the Serious Metaphysician
rest content? I think not; for one reason external to his metaphysics and other internal to it.
Taking these in order, it is far from clear that existence2 is conceptually continuous in
any interesting way with existence. For sure, the extension of ‘exists2’ is a subplurality of
that of ‘exists’, but it is hardly unique in this respect. Unless those philosophers acknowl-
edged above are correct, after all, everything exists: existence is a universal concept, and so
any restriction of the quantifier whatsoever will be a restriction of the existents – it hardly
follows that all restrictions of the quantifier correspond to interesting existence concepts.
So, for example, presumably the extension of ‘is, at the present moment, spatially located’
will pick out only existents at any given time, but it would be bizarre to therefore claim
it as an existence concept. The sense of ‘is, at the present moment, spatially located’ has
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nothing to do with existence. Nor, on the face of it, does that of ‘exists2’. Do not be mis-
led here by the occurence of ‘exists’ in E. What is at issue here is precisely whether E is
an (implicit) definition of ‘exists2’, as opposed to simply a true biconditional. To see the
difference, consider the old example beloved of philosophy of language lecturers:
G ‘Grass is green’ is true iff grass is green and Fermat’s Last Theorem is
true.
It would be haywire to take G as giving an interprative truth-condition of ‘grass is green’.
Now suppose that I am shown E and decide to start using ‘exists2. As I go about the world
I listen to the scientists and, armed with E, conclude that leptons ‘exist2’ as do quarks.
How have I come to this conclusion? Not by first hearing the scientist’s verdict on what
features in laws of nature, and then doing a further check to see if those things exist: how
would I establish that, over and above performing the scientific investigations that establish
their theoretical role? In any case scientists don’t aspire to talk about what doesn’t exist
(remember, this is now the ordinary English sense of ‘exists’). The existence conjunct in
(E) is playing no role in fixing the extension of ‘exists2’, and so is no part of the sense.
The fact that (E) is true (as it is, by stipulation) no more means that it gives the meaning of
‘exists2’ than the truth of (G) means that it gives the truth-conditions of ‘Grass is green’.
Even if this were not the case, (E) is irrelevant to assessing the position of the Serious
Ontologist. All sorts of things feature in laws of nature: there are laws of nature relating to
the reproductive cycles of organisms, the temeparture at which reactions occur and much
else besides. Are the laws of mathematics to be understood as laws of nature? What about
psychological laws – we are, after all, surely part of nature ourselves? It is apparent that on
a liberal understanding of ‘laws of nature’, approximating to the ordinary extension of the
expression, the desert landscape beloved of the Serious Ontologist will become cluttered
with the ontological equivalent of cacti if ‘exists2’ is taken to capture his real existence.
At this point he might protest that the things that really exist are those that feature in fun-
damental laws of nature. This is a case of seeking to illuminate the dim with the obscure.
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What does ‘fundamental’ mean? It is no using telling us that the fundamental laws of na-
ture are those whose quantifiers carve at the joints; that is arguing in a tight circle indeed.
And attempting illumination by appeal to metaphysical concepts themselves in urgent need
of explication, such as grounding, is an exercise in deferral, rather than solution, of a dif-
ficulty.16 As yet, we have no reason to believe that we understand, or can be brought to
understand, the word ‘exists’ in the Serious Ontologist’s sense.
Might the Serious Ontologist opt for a middle way here, and argue that the real exis-
tents are all and only those entities of which indispensable mention is made in the laws
of physics? He might, and it would stand in need of argument that he had thereby delin-
eated an interesting class of entities privileged in any way with respect to existence (rather
than just choosing to use the word ‘exists’ in a peculiar way, after the fashion of Humpty
Dumpty). In actual fact, however, the Serious Ontologist often retains for himself the op-
tion of holding that even the laws of physics do not go deep enough. Ontology might
concern purported entities, expressions for which do not feature in assertions outside the
bespoke discourse of metaphysics. Or it might even be claimed that the real existents are
hidden from us, that we cannot know (or have justified beliefs about) which entities really
exist, and must content ourselves qua metaphysicians with providing a general picture of
the structure of reality, constructing toy examples, or assaying possibly instanced ontolo-
gies.17 In the latter case we should simply maintain that we cannot come to acquire the
word ‘exists’ in the Serious Ontologist’s sense. In the former case, ‘exists’ as being used
as something akin to a theoretical term. This will be our next item of business.
3
Theoretical terms in the sciences for instance acquire their meaning within the context
of that theory, and language users may be brought to understand them through being in-
troduced to the relevant theory. A term like ‘positron’ acquires meaning through serving
a certain role within physical theory. The theory provides us with canonical uses of the
16On grounding, see [21] and [26].
17My own experience is that a fair proportion of those engaged with questions of ontology take the marking out
of modal space, as opposed to investigating what actually exists, to be the project in which they are engaged.
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word, a sense of the structural role of its referents, experimental identification criteria, and
so on, and so equips speakers with the resources to understand the term. It is unthinkable,
by contrast, that an understanding of ‘positron’ might be obtained without a complemen-
tary at-least-partial grasp of the theoretical context in which it is embedded. Might the
same thing be claimed for the Serious Ontologist’s ‘exists’? The problem here is that, ac-
cording to this understanding of theoretical terms, a given theoretical term is meaningful
only if the claims of the theory, or at least a sufficient number of them, as a whole are
meaningful. How can this be assured? I suggest that a promising criterion (afforded more
space, I would argue the only one) is that they represent a coherent pattern of potential
use, underwriting criteria for asserting and denying the theory’s sentences. These need not
be uniformly empirical, although it is a striking feature of scientific theories that they do
admit empirical confirmation (and this might be thought to anchor theoretical language in
the wider network of discourse about the empirical world), but must determine the correct
usage of the relevant theoretical terms. Here at least is one brief sketch of an account of
theoretical terms in science that explicates their meaningfulness. Could something similar
be achieved for the term ‘exists’?
The theoretical context in which the Serious Ontologist’s ‘exists’ occurs is that of meta-
physics. A Serious Ontologist might claim that tropes are the only entities which exist,
in his sense, and go on to explicate the world of our experience and language through
relationships of grounding, truthmaking, mereological composition, and so on – perhaps
gesturing towards a semantics for ordinary English ‘exists’.18 In the course of his the-
ory building he might touch on matters of modality, causation, free will, and other topics
from the metaphysics syllabus. Unlike the physicist, however, there is no sense in which
the Serious Ontologist’s metaphysical investigations can be viewed as converging towards
consensus with his peers.19 On the contrary, metaphysics as a discipline is characterised by
widespread disagreement, which shows no sign of abating with the progress of time. Not
only that, but this disagreement extends to the question on what basis first-order theoretical
18A ‘metaphysical semantics’ in Sider’s sense [18, 112-4].
19For considerations along these lines see [20, 15-22]
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disagreement should be resolved (is simplicity to be preferred to deductive power; how are
each of these to be assessed?) Nor will empirical evidence help to resolve the dispute, or to
anchor metaphysical language in a wider web of meaning, for metaphysics does not admit
empirical evidence.20 If the theoretical embedding of ‘exists’ succeeds in conferring any
meaning on the expression at all, then, it seems that as used by any given metaphysician
the word will have such bespoke assertion and denial conditions, and hence meaning, that
its particular extent extends little beyond the speaker’s own idiolect. It will be near useless
for the purposes of genuine communication and argument (as distinguished from making
noises in a thoughful fashion), and in particular there is no reason to believe that it will
have sufficient continuity of meaning with ordinary English ‘exists’ for Serious Ontolog-
ical debates to be considered streamlined versions of more workaday existence disputes
(‘Mummy, can we see the Loch Ness monster?’. ‘No, don’t be silly, it doesn’t exist’. ‘It
does too, I read a book about it’.).
At this point the Serious Ontologist may wish to invoke the name of Quine. We are
making a mistake, he can be imagined insisting, in regarding the relevant theoretical con-
text as consisting solely of metaphysics. Rather it is within the context of total science that
‘exists’ acquires the salient meaning. Allowing Quinean meaning-holism for the sake of
the immediate argument, this does not get the Serious Ontologist what he needs. For whilst
this approach will no doubt have it that there is some sense of the word ‘exists’ as used for
the purposes of total science – perhaps regimented in terms of the first-order quantifier after
the fashion of [16] – this will not be the required ‘deep’ sense. Which naturalistic criteria
internal to the practice of the sciences themselves make Γ′ a better theory than Γ, where Γ
accounts for the totality of experience acquired via retinas and ear-drums, elegantly theo-
rised, put through the mills of logic and mathematics, and subjected to experimental test,
whereas Γ′ adds to Γ the assertion that the only things that really exist are mereological
simples plus sentences detailing how non-fundamental ontology can be constructed out of
20There might be thought to be apparent counterexamples, with perhaps the philosophy of time providing the best
prima facie cases. In brief, it is difficult to see how – for instance – General Relativity constrains the assertions
of the metaphysical community as a whole. Any claim about the nature of time can be made to fit the physics
somehow, in the last resort by changing the subject (‘we do not mean by “time” what the physicist means’.)
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these? On whatever basis we respond to the generic problem of the underdetermination of
theory by evidence, surely a compulsory question for the philosophy of science, it looks
like Γ′ is going to come off worse than Γ. The alternative scenarios will be ones in which
adding assertions of the existence of mereological simples to theories is treated differently
from a theory-choice perspective than adding assertions of the existence of unobserved
pink elephants. But the justification for this move is going to be distinctively metaphysi-
cal, thereby contradicting the claim that the Serious Ontologist is working naturalistically
within total science.
4
Tim Button begins his recent book on the realism/ anti-realism dispute by quoting
William James, ‘Metaphysicians long for magic’ [3, 1].21 If all other attempts to show how
a language user could be brought to acquire an expression with the sense of the Serious On-
tologist’s ‘exists’ are in vain, there is always the option of having recourse to magic. The
most popular contemporary form of wizardry is reference magnetism. Following Lewis on
natural properties, metaphysicians have had recourse to the claim that, given a number of
competing candidate meanings for a referential expression, meanings which deliver more
natural referents are correspondingly more eligible [9][18, 21-3][8]. The metaphor of joint
carving often reappears in expounding the view: highly eligible meanings carve the beast
of reality near the joints. So, for instance blueness is more eligible to be the referrent of a
colour term than grueness,22 rabbits to be the referrent of a animal term than undetached
rabbit parts.
There are many problems with the idea of reference magnetism, which would occupy
another paper of their own. My own view is that it is at best the expression of a problem
rather than a solution to it. We no doubt very often do desire the result that expressions have
those meanings that the reference magnetist would describe as joint carving; although the
21The thought that metaphysical realists tend to fall back on magical theories of reference is derived from Put-
nam’s [14].
22Or so, at least, the point is often put. It seems to me that there is something to be said for the view that ‘grue’ is
a colour term (what else is it?). And if that is right then on any reasonable understanding of eligibility grueness
is a no less eligible meaning for it than blueness.
interest relativity of communication might cause more problems here than many suppose.
We name entities in order to communicate with one another, and the general purposes for
which we communicate therefore conditions our referential practices. Putnam’s imagined
Martians, who have reason to discourse about undetached-organism-parts on a regular ba-
sis would be surprised to learn that rabbits are highly joint-carving candidate referrents [13,
46-54]. Merely pointing out that ‘rabbit’ is supposed to be an animal term does little to as-
suage the interest-relativity here; instead it transfers the issue from species to genus.23 But
let’s allow that there is an interest-independent fact of the matter about which are the most
eligible meanings for at least some referential expressions. The most urgent philosophical
question this poses is how those meanings are possessed by expressions in a fashion that
is compatible with meaning being public, communicable, acquirable, and in some sense at
least manifest in the use of sentences containing those expressions. Simply to assert that
the meanings are indeed thus possessed does not answer this question. To do this merely
tacitly stipulates that it can be answered; hence the accusation of magic.
We can avoid these concerns by developing an account of eligibility which ties the no-
tion to the satisfaction of sortal concepts, although it will turn out that this does not help
the Serious Ontologist make a case that there is a uniquely eligible meaning for an exis-
tence predicate, which is not picked out by any natural language existence predicate.24 In
describing the eligibility of rabbits and blueness we noted that ‘rabbit’ and ‘blue’ each fall
under some more general sortal, ‘animal’ and ‘colour’ respectively. The reason that rabbits
are more eligible to be referrents of ‘rabbit’ than are undetached rabbit parts is that the
former are animals and the latter are not, and that language users introduced and persist
in using the word ‘rabbit’ to pick out animals. This is simply a witness to a more general
rule: an adequate account of the meaning of an expression is constrained by the use of the
word within the language. ‘Rabbit’ is used to refer to a animal, ‘pi’ is used to refer to a real
23Of course noting the potential interest-relativity of eligility does not licence an anything-goes-relativism. Noth-
ing said here is incompatible with there being some comprehensible sense in which reality has ‘joints’ (it’s just,
as in orthopaedics, which joints matter depend on what you’re trying to do), still less with there being serious
external constraints on our referential practices.
24Thanks to N for raising issues discussed in this paragraph.
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number, ‘janvier’ to a month, and so on.25 What about the Serious Ontologist’s ‘exists’?
Parallels with singular and common nouns are strained here. It doesn’t seem to make sense
to speak of existence as a case of a more encompassing kind: what would that be? Per-
haps, on the assumption that sentences containing ‘exists’ should be analysed uniformly as
quantificational in logical form26 a meaning-theoretic genus could be supplied in the form
of inference rules for the quantifier:
φ(t)
∃I
∃v φ(v)
∃v φ(v)
∃E
φ(t)
With the usual restrictions on terms (including variables).
This does not help: the only way to individuate species under this genus is by varying
restrictions on the admissible semantic values of substitutends for the term metavariables t.
In context asserting that there could be a specification of the most eligible such restriction
is equivalent to asserting that it could be known what really exists, but if we already clear
that we were in a position to know that the present worry would be moot. If ‘exists’ is
understood as a predicate, the prospects are no less bleak for Serious Ontology. In this
case the Lewisian account of natural kind terms is directly applicable. Real existence is a
magnet for our metaphysician’s ‘exists’ (although not, interestingly, for English ‘exists’).
A fundamental language would pick out those privileged entities that exist, independent of
mind and reality, at a fundamental level out there in reality.
25Objection: don’t we get a revenge problem here? Why should we assume that there is a uniquely eligible
meaning of the sortal noun ‘animal’? This is an interesting question, but the absence of a satisfactory answer will
only make things worse for the Serious Ontologist, so we can leave it to one side here.
26But, see fn. above.
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This pseudo-Lewisian response is deceptively reassuring. That this is so trades on our
having forgot the dialectical position. We were seeking reassurance from the Serious On-
tologist that his ‘exists’ could have a sense. It is worth being a little precise about the worry
here. Most partisans of the view do not claim that we have access to an expression with this
sense: an admission that already raises questions for me about the amount of interest the
investigation of real existence ought to attract. Rather the concern is that no language user,
however idealised or possible (whatever possibility might amount to here), could acquire
a fundamental language. Consider a language user with unlimited cognitive and memo-
rial resources and who speaks a ‘language’ in which every object serves as its own name,
called Lagadonian after Gulliver’s Travels [10, 145]. Furthermore, if it doesn’t already
stretch comprehensibility too much, imagine that in this particular Lagaonian language ev-
ery property serves as the corresponding predicate. Could this being speak a fundamental
language? It depends entirely on whether there is such a property as real, thought and lan-
guage independent existence. If there is no such property, our preternaturally expressive
speaker is no more in a position to predicate it than we are.
Perhaps though God is in such a position; theological metaphors abound in Serious On-
tology. The thought then would be that for God to name an object just is to constitute it as a
real, mind and language independent existent. Leaving aside momentarily the problems of
the suggestion that God is a language user, or has a mind, this does not establish the legiti-
macy of Serious Ontology. God’s language, on this story, would not be mind-independent
for God (compare Berkeley). Might there be some relative sense in which the entities God
says exist are the targets of a creaturely fundamental language: the real, language and mind
independent existents out there in the world, which are not necessarily the same things we
pick out with English ‘exists’? My inclination is to diagnose this as surrender under the
disguise of rescue: to say that Serious Ontology would be possible for us were we God
is just to admit that we cannot do Serious Ontology, and simply noting that God could
do Serious Ontology (if we can make sense even of this) is poor motivation for the pur-
suit of a philosophical research programme. Yet even this strikes me as over optimistic,
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for I doubt that we in working through the paragraph thus far have in fact succeeded in
grasping a thought that does the Serious Ontologist’s required work. We have been using
familiar expressions, ‘language’ and ‘thought’, with respect to circumstances distant from
their ordinary use, namely the life of God. These conditions are ripe for grammatically
well-formed sentences creating the illusion of understanding where there is none.27 There
is no merit in defending an esoteric sense of ‘exists’ by appeal to equally esoteric senses
of ‘language’ and ‘thought’.
Where does this leave us? This paper has been a fast-paced and broad-brush engage-
ment with the worldview of the Serious Ontologist. For this I make no apologies, because
I do not think the problems with that worldview subsist in the details but in the very project
as conceived, understood as issuing from the picture on which the proper subject of on-
tological investigation is existence in a privileged metaphysical sense – fundamental, or
real, or deep, whatever it may be. The philosopher who engages in such a project needs
to at least supply some reason to believe that a language expressing such a sense of ‘ex-
ists’ could be acquired. In the absence of any such reason there must be a concern that it
is not possible to say, nor to think, that anything exists in the Serious Ontologist’s sense.
This being so, the question, asked by him, ‘what exists?’ is not meaningful; nor – more
to the point – is ‘What exists in the sense ‘exists’ would have in a joint-carving variant
of English?’. The complaint is not that the Serious Ontologist has no justification for any
particular answer to this question. Serious Ontologists themselves generally concede as
much and content themselves with sketching toy theories, outling possible ways the world
could be. Rather, before we even get to the stage of limning the fundamental furniture of
the universe, actual or possible, the enquiry is out of order, since it is not addressing an
intelligible question. Even the perfunctory Quinean response ‘everything’ would be out of
order in this context, since there is no question to which it is the answer.28
27A defence here would be an appeal to analogy. I think this is unpromising in these cases, but discussion
would take us too far off track. Note that metaphor will not suffice here. The metaphor of God writing the
book of the world is uncontroversially in order, but to say that ‘God writes’ is metaphorical is, in the current
philosophical theologicalsense of metaphor (as distinguished from analogy – see for instance Aquinas at STh
I,Q13,A3.) amongst other things to say that it is false.
28Of course, in response to ‘What exists?’ asked in English, ‘everything’ is a perfectly acceptable answer.
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My contention, on the basis of the preceding considerations, is that this is not possible.
This in no way an anti-metaphysical conclusion. As several authors have noted, the elision
of metaphysics with ontology is of recent vintage [20, Ch. 1] [17]. Nothing said here rules
out attention to the categorisation of entities, their identity and persistence conditions, the
relationships of dependence between them, or unearthing the irreducible commitments of
the special sciences. It is far from clear that the loss of Serious Ontology is damaging to
the prospects for investigating the characteristic metaphysical questions in the philosophies
of time, mind, and religion. The burgeoning and important field of social ontology would
only be helped by a move away from Serious Ontology: understanding, say, class or gen-
der is both more interesting and of greater political salience than enquiring after whether
these really exist. With regard to mathematics, the kind of project that asks whether math-
ematical entities are fundmanental (which has been common of late), is ruled out of court,
but this leaves open the door to renewed debates about realism and anti-realism, the rela-
tionship of mathematicalia to other entities, and much else besides. There remains plenty
of work for metaphysicians to do.
Zedson could abandon Serious Ontology without joining McX and Wyman in retire-
ment. Perhaps he should.29.
29Thanks to Jade Fletcher, Sam Lebens, Jonathan Nassim, Léa Salje, Naomi Thompson, and Robbie Williams
and audiences at Kings College London and the Leeds Centre for Metaphysics and Mind for discussions of the
work presented here. This work was completed whilst the author was engaged in the ERC funded ‘Nature of
Representation’ project (grant agreement number 312938).
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